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Abstract: 
Major reforms were introduced into the English NHS in the early to mid 2000s, helping to 
reduce waiting times and length of stay for elective surgery.  One concern, however, is that 
efficiency-oriented reforms may harm equity by giving hospitals an incentive to select against 
socio-economically disadvantaged patients who stay longer and cost more to treat.  This paper 
aims to assess the likely magnitude of any such selection incentive in the test case of hip 
replacement.  Anonymous hospital records are extracted on all 235,813 patients admitted to 
English NHS Hospital Trusts for elective total hip replacement from 2001/2 through 2007/8.  
The relationship between length of stay and small area income deprivation is modelled using 
linear regression, allowing for other patient characteristics (age, sex, number and type of 
diagnoses, procedure type), year effects and Trust effects.  Allowing for these factors, patients 
from the most deprived tenth of areas stayed 6% longer than others in 2001/2, falling to 2% by 
2007/8.  By comparison, patients aged 85 or over stayed 57% longer than others in 2001/2, rising 
to 71% by 2007/8, and patients with seven or more diagnoses stayed 58% longer than others in 
2001/2, rising to 73% by 2007/8.  Potential incentives for NHS hospitals to select hip 
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1. Introduction 
Inspired by ideas of “new public management”, health system reforms often aim to improve 
productive efficiency in the delivery of health services by re-aligning provider incentives (Cutler 
2002).  Major health reforms introduced to the English NHS in the early to mid 2000s are a case 
in point.  These reforms were introduced by a Labour administration led by Prime Minister Tony 
Blair and his Chancellor Gordon Brown, who subsequently became Prime Minister from 2007-
10. 
 
The “Blair/Brown” health reforms included waiting time targets for elective surgery, case based 
hospital payment, and new entry of private sector hospitals into the market for publicly funded 
NHS patients.  A primary aim of these reforms was to give hospitals stronger incentives to 
reduce waiting times and length of stay for elective surgery.  Both waiting times and length of 
stay did indeed fall substantially as the reforms were phased in and, at least in the case of waiting 
time targets, there is good research evidence that this was a causal effect: a well conducted 
difference-in-difference study using Scotland as a control group (Windmeijer et al. 2009).   
 
Given the importance of equity goals to all publicly funded health systems, however, it is natural 
to be concerned about possible trade-offs between efficiency and equity.  One such concern 
relates to potential perverse incentives in relation to hospital admission decisions.  In theory, 
hospitals placed under pressure to reduce waiting times and increase patient throughput, within 
tight budget constraints, might respond not by improving productive efficiency but instead by 
selecting in favour of short-staying, low-cost patients (“cream skimming”) and/or against long-
staying, high-cost patients (“patient dumping”).  If poor patients tend to stay much longer in 
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hospital and cost much more to treat, hospitals might thereby face an incentive directly or 
indirectly to discriminate on the basis of socio-economic status (Tudor-Hart 2006, Cookson et al. 
in press). 
 
For example, imagine a hospital orthopaedic department treats 200 elective hip replacement 
patients a year with average length of stay 5 days, plus 50 patients with average length of stay 10 
days.  If the hospital could somehow avoid treating the 50 long staying patients, this would 
release 500 bed days which could be put to alternative use – for example, in treating 100 
additional short staying patients to reduce waiting times.   
 
To influence hospital admission decisions, however, the predicted differentials in length of stay 
and cost would have to be substantial, given that social and professional norms of medical ethics 
militate against socio-economic and other forms of discrimination in health care.  This paper 
therefore aims to provide some evidence, in the context of the English NHS, about whether 
socio-economically disadvantaged patients do indeed stay substantially longer in hospital than 
other patients. 
 
Our paper does aim to measure actual selection behaviour by NHS hospitals or to identify 
whether the “Blair/Brown” health reforms led to increased selection behaviour.  Our analysis 
cannot determine the magnitude of any pre-existing selection behaviour in 2001/2 or whether 
selection behaviour changed over time.  Instead, our paper has the more modest aim of 
investigating the size of potential incentives for NHS hospitals to select against patients on the 
basis of deprivation, using length of stay differentials between different patient groups as a proxy 
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for these potential incentives.  We focus mainly on the year 2001/2, prior to the Blair/Brown 
health reforms which we hypothesise may have strengthened the link between length of stay 
differentials and both financial and non-financial selection incentives for NHS hospitals.  We 
then also examine subsequent years, to see how these potential incentives have changed over 
time. 
 
To avoid problems of case mix confounding when comparing length of stay between 
heterogeneous patients and treatment categories, we focus narrowly on the specific tracer 
procedure of elective primary total hip replacement.  This is a good test case for our socio-
economic patient selection hypothesis, because hip replacement is a common procedure with 
substantial length of stay and considerable clinical uncertainty about appropriate use.  If 
efficiency-oriented health reforms generate substantial and widespread incentives for socio-
economic patient selection, then one would expect to find such incentives in relation to hip 
replacement.  Hip replacement is also a useful and well-studied tracer procedure for examining 
issues of health care inequality, and there is considerable evidence of pre-existing socio-
economic inequality in use of hip replacement in the English NHS prior to the period under study 
in this paper (Cookson, Dusheiko and Hardman, 2007).  Finally, hip replacement is also of 
interest in its own right, as a high volume procedure (the NHS does about 40 thousand elective 
primary total hip replacements a year – see table 2 below) with a high political profile during the 
period under consideration, due to severe waiting time problems and particular difficulty in 
meeting government waiting time targets. 
 
DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION 
 5 
We use anonymous patient level hospital records covering all NHS Hospital Trusts in England, 
including data on length of stay, small area deprivation, age, sex, number and type of diagnoses, 
type of procedure, and hospital of treatment.  This includes almost all NHS funded operations – 
apart from the small fraction carried out under the “Independent Sector Treatment Centre” 
programme (see below) – but does not include privately funded operations.  We use a small area 
level index of income deprivation as a proxy for socio-economic status, since routine patient 
level data on income and other aspects of socio-economic status are not available.  We use 
patient level repeated cross section data for an unbalanced panel of all NHS Hospital Trusts 
followed for seven financial years 2001/2 through 2007/8, which enables us to examine how far 
the answer to our headline question changes over time throughout the reform period. 
 
We find that patients from the most deprived decile of English small areas stay about 6% longer 
than other patients in 2001/2, falling to 2% by 2007/8.  This differential is small compared with 
observed differentials in relation to age and co-morbidity.  For instance, patients aged 85 or over 
stayed 57% longer than other patients in 2001/2, rising to 71% by 2007/8, and patients with 
seven or more diagnoses stayed 58% longer than other patients in 2001/2, rising to 73% by 
2007/8.  This suggests that, in relation to hip replacement surgery, the poor do not cost much 
more – but the very elderly and the very sick do. 
 
2. Background 
Two decades ago, following the introduction of the Medicare prospective payment system in 
1983, a classic US study found that poorer patients stay longer in hospital and cost more to treat 
(Epstein, Stern and Weissman, 1990).  That study of 16,908 patients admitted in 1987 to five 
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Massachusetts hospitals found that patients in the lowest third of socio-economic status (by 
patient level income, occupation and education) had between 3 to 30% longer stays and probably 
also required more resources, after adjusting for case-mix using Diagnosis Related Group 
(DRG), age, and severity.  Unfortunately, however, it is not straightforward to generalise the 
findings from this US study to a different health system such as the present day English NHS, 
which has a different set of health care institutions, incentives and professional practice styles 
and which serves patients facing a different set of socio-economic conditions. 
 
We examine a period of persistently falling length of stay, allowing us to examine whether 
length of stay declines at different rates across different socio-economic groups.  This period 
encompasses the introduction of a number of reforms that have attracted international interest, 
including the following.  First, an aggressive sequence of maximum waiting time targets for 
elective surgery coupled with sanctions for poorly performing managers: 18 months from 
outpatient consultation to inpatient treatment by March 2001 then falling by three months a year 
to 6 months by March 2005 and ultimately to 18 weeks from GP referral to inpatient treatment 
by December 2008 (Propper et al., 2008).  Second, an ambitious system of fixed price hospital 
payment, following the US, Australia and several other mostly European countries (Street and 
Maynard, 2007).  This was piloted in 2003/4 and 2004/5 for growth activity in some elective care 
– including hip replacement – and implemented fully for all elective care from 2005/6.  Third, 
new non-public sector entry into the publicly funded NHS market for high volume, low risk 
elective hospital procedures under the “Independent Sector Treatment Centre” (ISTC) 
programme (Propper, Wilson and Burgess, 2006).  ISTC activity comprised 0.07% of total NHS 
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elective activity in 2003/4 rising to 0.66%, 0.92% and 1.20% in subsequent years to 2006/7, 
including 7% of elective hip replacement activity in 2006/7 (Audit Commission, 2008). 
 
The English NHS fixed price hospital payment system is known as “Payment by Results”, and 
uses a DRG-style system known as “Healthcare Resource Groups” (HRGs), which are baskets of 
clinically similar treatments with similar resource use.  In 2007/8, the standard price for a 
cemented primary elective total hip replacement, code HRG 80, was £5,305 (Department of 
Health, 2007).  This was a simple fixed price with no risk adjustment for pre-operatively 
observable cost drivers such as age, sex, and the number and type of secondary diagnoses; and 
no supplementary payment for post-operative complications requiring additional hospital 
resources.  The only supplementary payment was a per diem payment of £222 for length of stay 
beyond a trim point of 16 days.  This supplementary payment was intended to compensate for 
the extra costs of exceptionally long staying patients, without giving any incentive to increase 
length of stay.   
 
Since the introduction of the NHS prospective payment system, the price of each elective and 
non elective procedure has been based on the national average cost of producing the 
corresponding HRG two years before, as reported by each hospital. Hospital costs are recorded 
in the national “Reference Cost” dataset, which supplies information on costs in every NHS 
Hospital Trust in England at level of HRG produced.  This Reference Cost dataset is the most 
disaggregated level of information on hospital costs routinely collected in the NHS, and micro-
costing data itemising resource use for individual patients is not available. 
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2. Methods 
Regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between patient level length of stay and 
small area income deprivation, controlling for other factors.  Patient level covariates include age, 
sex, number of diagnoses, type of diagnosis and type of hip replacement (with or without bone 
cement).  Area income deprivation, age, and number of diagnoses were divided into ordered 
groups and modelled using dummy variables, to allow for non-linear relationships with length of 
stay.  Age was divided into five age groups: age 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84 and 85+.  Number of 
diagnoses was divided into seven groups: 1 through 6 diagnoses and 7 or more diagnoses. 
 
We use three different models to allow for national time trends and heterogeneity in hospital 
level factors such as efficiency, clinical practice style and accounting practices: 
 Model (1): Trust-year random effects OLS. 
 Model (2): Trust level fixed effects OLS with year dummies. 
 Model (3): Generalised Linear Model with gamma log link and Trust dummies. 
 
Model (1) allows us to examine what proportion of the variance in length of stay is at hospital 
level (i.e. between hospitals) rather than patient level (i.e. within hospitals).  The estimated fixed 
effects from model (2) are also used to examine whether hospitals that take a large percentage of 
their population from deprived areas tend to have longer stays after adjustment for patient level 
deprivation.  Model (3) is used as a sensitivity analysis, to test the OLS assumption of asymptotic 
normality in our large sample.  For each model, we run a single year regression for 2001/2 to 
examine the size of potential selection incentives at baseline in 2001/2, as well as a pooled 
regression 2001/2 to 2007/8 to see how far those potential incentives have changed over time. 
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We also conducted sensitivity analysis to test for possible age-deprivation and diagnosis-
deprivation interactions.  We exclude long-staying outliers with length of stay greater than 60 
days, making up 1,023 cases or just over 0.4% of the total. In sensitivity analysis we include 
patients with length of stay no greater than 240 days (975 extra patients). The full results are 
available from the authors on request. 
 
Trends in adjusted length of stay (Table 7) were obtained using the indirect standardization 
procedure described in O’Donnell et al. (2008). This allows us to purge the effect of confounders 
on length of stay (e.g. the patient’s age or severity) without removing the influence of the key 




We use anonymous individual hospital records for all patients admitted for elective hip 
replacement in English NHS Hospital Trusts for each financial year from 2001/2 through 2007/8.  
We include all elective admissions involving primary total prosthetic replacement of the hip 
joint. The latter are identified under HRG H01, H02, H80, H81 and OPCS-4 codes W37.1, 
W38.1 and W39.1 as reported under the main operation of the first episode of care.  These 
OPCS-4 codes represent the three main variants of this procedure – “using cement”, “not using 
cement”, and “not elsewhere classified”. We exclude patients coming for revisions or 
conversions of previous hip operations as their length of stay might partially depend on the 
quality of care received in past admissions.  We also exclude other types of hip replacement 
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operation such as hybrid prosthetic replacements, resurfacings, and prosthetic replacement of the 
neck of femur. 
 
We exclude from the analysis 7 NHS Hospital Trusts with a volume of activity lower than 25 
hips operations per year (255 observations in 2001/2-2007/8). These are most likely hospitals 
that occasionally supply extra capacity to NHS trusts, since a regular orthopaedic speciality 
manages an average of 258 primary hip operations per year. Due to mergers, the number of NHS 
Hospital Trusts fell during the period from 166 in 2001/2 to 156 in 2002/3, then 154 in 2003/4, 
149 in 2004/5 and finally down to 148 in 2006/7. We exclude activity from “Independent Sector 
Treatment Centres”, which grew from 0% up to about 7% of NHS hip replacement activity from 
2003/4 to 2006/7, due to substantially incomplete reporting of this data (Audit Commission, 
2008).  There are no publicly available data on privately funded hospital activity in England for 
the period under consideration.  The most recent publicly available data is a sample survey in 
1997/8, which found that private activity made up 22.5% of all elective total hip replacement 
activity in England (Williams et al., 2000). 
 
Hospital records are extracted from the national “Hospital Episode Statistics” database as 
continuous inpatient spells (CIPS), which allow for transfers between different consultants both 
within the same hospital and between hospitals.  The standard unit of activity available to users 
of the Hospital Episode Statistics database is the “finished consultant episode” (FCE).  This is 
defined as the time the patient spends under the care of the same consultant. However, this can 
only measure length of stay for the period during which the initial hip replacement procedure is 
performed, before the patient is transferred to another consultant or hospital for any further 
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treatment that may be necessary.  The use of CIPS allows us accurately to measure length of stay 
for the full period of care from admission to discharge, including treatments for any 
complications following the first FCE and transfers to different providers of care.  The 
computation of CIPS requires a complex matching algorithm (Lakhani et al., 2005).  We use the 
CIPS matching algorithm set out in Castelli, Laudicella and Street (2008), pp 14-20 Section 2.  A 
non-trivial proportion of elective hip replacement patients are transferred to another consultant or 
hospital: 5.5% of continuous inpatient spells with length of stay less than or equal to 60 days 
involved two or more finished consultant episodes, and 3.2 % involved a transfer to another 
hospital. 
 
The number of diagnoses reported in the HES dataset runs from 1 to a maximum of 14 from 
2002/3 onwards (though only a maximum of 7 diagnoses in 2001/2).  Number of diagnoses is 
sometimes referred to as number of co-morbidities (Hamilton and Bramley-Harker, 1999).  
However, this indicator also includes diagnoses acquired during the first FCE of hospital stay, 
including any surgical complications and hospital acquired infections.  So to some extent this 
indicator may pick up variations in quality of care, as well as variations in patient co-morbidity. 
 
Small area income deprivation is measured at Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) level using the 
income deprivation domain of the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2004 (IMD 2004).  
There are 32,482 LSOAs in England with a mean population of about 1,500 individuals and a 
minimum of 1,000.  The IMD 2004 income domain score indicates the proportion of the LSOA 
population in 2001 who were living in low income households reliant on one or more means 
tested benefits, based on population census and benefit claims data (Office of the Deputy Prime 
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Minister, 2004).  The income domain score was divided into deciles based on the population of 
income deprivation scores for all English LSOAs, rather than the population of income 
deprivation scores for all NHS hip replacement patients in our study.  A patient’s deprivation 
decile thus reflects the degree of income deprivation in their neighbourhood relative to England 
as a whole, and is comparable from one year to another.  Simply dividing the study population of 
hip replacement patients into ten equally sized groups by deprivation score yields a less general 
and less comparable indicator.  The deprivation mix among hip replacement patients may differ 
from the deprivation mix among the general population, and may vary from one year to the next 
as a result of changes in hospital admission practices and other aspects of hospital supply and 
demand. In sensitivity analysis we check the robustness of our results using an alternative 
measure of LSOA level income deprivation: the income domain of the Index of Economic 
Deprivation 2008. This index provide a time varying measure of deprivation from 1999/2000 to 




4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 presents global descriptive statistics for the main variables used in regressions, across all 
seven years from 2001/2 to 2007/8, excluding patients with length of stay over 60 days.  The 
median length of stay is 8 days for the whole period, with mean 9.08 days and standard deviation 
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5.81 days.  The median age is 70, 38% of the patients are male, and 22% receive uncemented hip 
replacement.  The median number of diagnoses is 2, with mean 2.56 and standard deviation 1.74. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on a year-by-year basis, for all patients and also comparing 
patients living in the most income deprived tenth of English small areas with other patients.  
There is a substantial decline over time in length of stay, with overall mean length of stay falling 
from 10.86 days in 2001/2 to 7.14 days in 2007/8.  There is also a substantial increase in activity, 
with the total number of patients treated rising from 34,088 in 2001/2 to 41,561 in 2007/8. 
 
Mean length of stay is higher in the deprived group than the non-deprived group in all years, 
though the absolute gap falls from 1.1 days in 2001/2 to only 0.33 days by 2007/8.  The ratio 
between the two groups also declines, with length of stay about 10% higher in 2001/2 but only 
about 5% higher in 2007/8.  Patients from the most deprived tenth of small areas make up about 
6% of all patients for most of the period, though this jumps to 7% in 2007/8.  This figure is 
smaller than 10% because patients from more deprived areas are less likely than other patients to 
receive a hip replacement (Cookson, Dusheiko and Hardman 2007). 
 
The mean number of diagnoses increased throughout the period in both deprived and non-
deprived groups, initially at a similar rate though more rapidly in the deprived group in 2005/6.  
The mean number of diagnoses in the most deprived group was only 1-4% higher between 
2001/2 and 2004/5, though this jumps to 10-12% between 2005/6 and 2007/8.  There was little 
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difference between the two groups in the gender mix or the proportion of uncemented hip 
replacements, though the deprived group was on average about one year younger in 2001/2 and 
two years younger by 2007/8.  
 
Interestingly, the total number of admissions peaks in 2003/4, falls slightly until 2006/7, then 
jumps back up again in 2007/8. This trend might be partially explained by the growing activity 
of NHS funded independent sector treatment centres (ISTCs), which become progressively 
operational in orthopaedic care from 2004/5 but then tailed off from 2007/8.  This ISTC activity 
has been excluded from our dataset due to incomplete reporting. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 shows kernel density plots of length of stay for patients in 2001/2, comparing patients 
living in the most income deprived fifth of English small areas versus others.  It is clear that the 
vast majority of patients stay less than 20 days, though there is a long thin tail of outlier long-
staying patients.  Patients from income deprived areas stay somewhat longer than others, with a 
larger proportion in the 5-10 day range and a smaller proportion in the 10-20 day range.  There 
appears to be relatively little difference in the proportion of long staying outlier patients in the 
two groups.  The differences in mean length of stay observed in table 2 thus do not appear to be 
driven by a small number of outlier patients. 
 
Table 3 about here 
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Table 3 presents unadjusted mean length of stay by income deprivation tenths for each financial 
year from 2001/2 through 2007/8, together with the standard deviation and the proportion of 
patients in each group.  The absolute gap in length of stay between the most and least deprived 
groups fell from 1.5 days to 0.8 days between 2001/2 and 2007/8.  The ratio also fell a little: 
mean length of stay was about 14% higher for patients in the most deprived tenth of small areas 
than patients in the least deprived tenth in 2001/2, falling to about 12% higher by 2007/8.  The 
standard deviation of length of stay is also slightly higher in the more deprived groups, 
suggesting slightly higher risk. Again, however, the differentials are not large: 22% in 2001/2 
and 26% in 2007/8. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 about here 
 
Tables 4 and 5 present unadjusted means and standard deviations in length of stay by age group 
and number of diagnoses group.  The differences in both means and standard deviations between 
these age and diagnosis groups are considerably larger than those between deprivation groups.  
For instance, patients aged 85 or older stay 97% longer than patients age 45-54 in 2001/2, with a 
standard deviation 154% higher, rising to 123% longer with a standard deviation 183% higher by 
2007/8.  And patients with seven or more diagnoses stay 71% longer than patients with only one 
diagnosis in 2001/2, with a standard deviation 112% higher, rising to 106% longer with a 
standard deviation 149% higher by 2007/8. 
 
We now turn to the regression analysis, to examine how far these unadjusted relationships are 
modified after adjusting for other patient characteristics and Trust level factors. 
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4.2 Regression analysis 
Table 6 about here 
 
Table 6 presents the regression results from models 1, 2 and 3 as applied to data from our 
baseline year of 2001/2.  All three models show a similar pattern and magnitude of results.  The 
results from OLS models 1 and 2 are easy to interpret, as each coefficient represents an absolute 
difference in mean length of stay in days compared with the relevant comparator group.  The 
results of model 3 are mainly of interest as a sensitivity analysis, and give us confidence about 
the large sample asymptotic normality assumption underlying OLS models 1 and 2.  The 
coefficients of model 3 can be interpreted as percentage changes in mean length of stay 
compared with the mean, and so to compare them with the OLS coefficients they can be 
multiplied by the mean length of stay of 9 days.   
 
We prefer fixed effects model 2 to random effects model 1, for two main reasons.  First, our 
main interest lies in estimating individual level associations between deprivation and length of 
stay, after controlling for hospital level factors, rather than estimating hospital level associations 
after controlling for individual level factors (Rice and Jones 1997).  Second, the estimates from 
model 1 may be slightly biased due to correlation between patient characteristics and hospital 
random effects, as suggested by the variance decomposition analysis presented below.  So in 
what follows we focus on the results from fixed effects model 2. 
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In fixed effects model 2, after controlling for patient characteristics (age, sex, number and type of 
diagnoses, uncemented procedure or not), patients from the least deprived tenth of areas on 
average stay 0.9 days less than patients from the most deprived tenth of areas in 2001/2.  This is 
smaller than the corresponding 1.5 day unadjusted gap between most and least deprived decile 
groups, and is only slightly larger than the adjusted 0.8 day gap between men and women. 
 
The gap in length of stay between most and least deprived decile groups rises to 1.0 days in 
random effects model 1.  Estimates from model 1 are influenced by variation between hospitals, 
as well as variation between patients, and so this suggests that Hospital Trusts with above-
average lengths of stay tend to admit a slightly above-average proportion of income deprived 
patients – an issue explored further below. 
 
Age group and diagnosis group remain substantially more powerful determinants of length of 
stay after adjusting for other factors.  In fixed effects model 2, the adjusted length of stay gap 
between patients aged 85 and over and patients aged 45-54 in 2001/2 is 7.74 days (slightly lower 
than the unadjusted gap of 8.39 days), and the adjusted gap between patients with 7 or more 
diagnoses and one diagnosis is 7.18 days (slightly higher than the unadjusted gap of 7.00 days). 
 
In sensitivity analysis, there were no significant, substantial or systematic interactions between 
age and deprivation or between diagnosis group and deprivation. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
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Figure 2 shows mean length of stay by deprivation group and year after adjusting for age, 
number and type of diagnoses, procedure type, and hospital level factors using fixed effects 
model 2 as applied to pooled data from 2001/2 to 2007/8.  The lines show a shallow adjusted 
gradient in length of stay from first to tenth income deprivation groups, for each of the years.  
The lines also illustrate the persistent year-on-year falls in length of stay throughout the period, 
each one of which is larger than the corresponding year’s length of stay gap between most and 
least deprived decile groups.  That is, for any given year, the average difference in length of stay 
between most and least deprived decile groups is smaller than the average difference in length of 
stay between this year and next year. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
Table 7 shows adjusted length of stay differentials by year, for deprivation, age and co-morbidity 
using fixed effects model 2. Unlike the figures in tables 3, 4 and 5, these adjusted figures allow 
for correlations between deprivation, age, co-morbidity. For example, deprivation differentials in 
Table 7 show the gap in average length of stay between top and bottom deprivation deciles after 
purging heterogeneity in age, sex, number and type of diagnoses across the two groups. This is 
the difference in length of stay that one would observe if all the confounding characteristics (i.e. 
age, sex, number and type of diagnoses) were the same across socio-economic groups. Trends in 
table 7 allow for the fact that deprived and elderly people may also tend to have more diagnoses 
– and attempt to identify a “purer” association purged of the influence of these other factors. 
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These adjusted figures show that patients in the most deprived decile group stay about 6% longer 
than other patients in 2001/2, falling to 2% longer by 2007/8.  Whereas patients aged 85 or over 
stay 57% longer than patients aged 45-54 in 2001/2, rising to 71% longer in 2007/8.  And 
patients with seven or more diagnoses stayed 58% longer in 2001/2, rising to 73% longer by 
2007/8.  In each case, of course, the absolute length of stay differentials fell over time in line 
with the general year-on-year fall in length of stay. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Figures 3 and 4 present predictions from fixed effects model 2 as applied to 2001/2.  Figure 3 
shows the adjusted relationships between length of stay, age group and income deprivation 
decile.  Although there is a deprivation gradient in length of stay within each age group, this 
gradient is dwarfed by the larger differences between age groups. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Figure 4 shows the predicted relationships between length of stay, number of diagnoses and 
deprivation decile group.  Again, the deprivation gradient within each diagnosis group is dwarfed 
by the larger differences between diagnoses groups. 
 
Table 8 about here 
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Table 8 presents a decomposition of hospital level and patient level variance from fixed effects 
model 2 applied to pooled data from years 2001/2 through 2007/8.  This shows that only about 
5% or less of the variance is at hospital level in each of the years.  For instance, in a model with 
patient characteristics, only 4.8% of the variance is at hospital level in 2001/2, falling slightly to 
4.5% in 2007/8.  However, the corresponding figures are slightly higher (5.2% and 4.1%, 
respectively) in a model without patient characteristics.  This difference suggests that one of the 
independence assumptions of the random effects model is violated: there is a degree of 
systematic variation between Trusts in the characteristics of patients treated. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
Finally, figure 5 presents a scatterplot of the hospital fixed effects from model 2, with confidence 
intervals, against the mean deprivation score of patients treated by each hospital.  The fixed 
effects can be interpreted as hospital level differences in mean length of stay after adjusting for 
deprivation and other patient characteristics.  There is a slight suggestion of a positive 
association, suggesting that hospitals treating more deprived patient populations tend to have 
longer lengths of stay, even after allowing for the composition of their patient populations.  
However, this association is largely driven by four outlier hospitals with relatively high mean 
patient deprivation scores, so must be interpreted with caution. 
 
5. Conclusion 
On average, NHS elective hip replacement patients living in more income deprived areas of 
England do stay slightly longer in hospital than patients living in less income deprived areas.  
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However, this association is small.  Age and co-morbidity are considerably more powerful 
determinants of length of stay for elective total hip replacement than small area deprivation. 
 
This is clearly illustrated in table 7, which compares patients with the relevant “high risk” 
characteristic (i.e. age over 85, seven or more diagnoses, and the most deprived tenth) with all 
other patients, after adjusting for other patient characteristics using our preferred fixed effects 
model 2.  This is perhaps the most appropriate comparison for an unscrupulous hospital manager 
interested to know how large a saving in length of stay could be made by selecting against (or 
“dumping”) patients with that particular “high risk” characteristic and instead treating other 
patients.  After adjusting for other patient characteristics, patients over 85 stayed 6.06 days 
longer than other patients in 2001/2 – i.e. 57% longer.  Patients with seven or more diagnoses 
stayed 6.23 days longer than other patients in 2001/2 – i.e. 58% longer.  Whereas patients from 
the most deprived decile group of small areas only stayed 0.62 days longer than other patients – 
i.e. 6% longer. 
 
Table 7 also shows that the absolute differentials fell during the period 2001/2 to 2007/8, in line 
with general year-on-year reductions in length of stay.  Interestingly, however, the relative 
differential fell to 2% by 2007/8 in the case of deprivation, whereas the relative differentials for 
age and co-morbidity grew during this period (to 71% and 73% respectively).  This suggests that 
NHS hospitals have been relatively successful in reducing length of stay for long staying patients 
such as the elderly and those with severe, multiple co-morbidities.  In relative terms, however, 
this means that age and co-morbidity are even more powerful determinants of length of stay in 
2007/8 than they were in 2001/2; and small area deprivation even less powerful. 
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One reason that people from deprived areas stay slightly longer in hospital on average than 
others is that they may have more co-morbidity – such as obesity, heart conditions, and other 
health problems – and hence take longer to recover.  Our regression analysis partly allows for 
this, by controlling for the number and type of diagnoses.  However, we do not allow for the 
severity of co-morbidity.  Other possible reasons are that patients from deprived areas may have 
less pleasant and supportive household environments to return to, and there may be socio-
cultural factors relating to patient and professional behaviour, such as the quality of 
communication and diagnosis and patient adherence to medication and recovery regimes. 
 
Our main conclusion is that deprivation differentials in length of stay are small compared with 
differentials associated with age and co-morbidity.  There may be incentives for NHS hospitals 
under pressure to cut waiting times to avoid offering elective hip replacements to very elderly 
patients and patients with substantial co-morbidity.  However, any incentives to avoid offering 
elective hip replacements to patients from deprived areas appear negligibly small.  In the case of 
elective hip replacement, the poor cost a bit more – but not much more. 
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Table 1: Global descriptive statistics for key variables (pooled across all years) 
 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.Median Min Max
Patient length of stay (days) 274,679 9.08 5.81 8 0 60
Patient male or not 274,669 0.38 0.49 0 0 1
Patient age 274,679 69.64 9.42 70 45 103
Patient area income deprivation score 274,679 0.12 0.10 0 0 0.96
Patient number of diagnoses 274,679 2.56 1.74 2 1 14
Patients receiving uncemented hip 
(rather than cemented) 274,679 0.22 0.42 0 0 1
Hospital Trust total activity 2001-2007 184 1,500 1,068 1,473 37 5,141
Hospital Trust total activity by year 184 258 150 229 25 900
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for key variables by year and deprivation group 
(most deprived decile group versus others) 
Mean length of stay 
(days) (1) Most deprived (*) 11.90 11.25 10.49 9.92 9.34 8.42 7.45
(2) Others 10.79 10.45 9.68 9.23 8.56 7.78 7.12
(3) All 10.86 10.50 9.73 9.27 8.61 7.82 7.14
gap (1) - (2) 1.11 0.80 0.81 0.69 0.78 0.64 0.33
ratio (1) / (2) 1.10 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.09 1.08 1.05
Patients treated (1) Most deprived (*) 2,095 2,287 2,365 2,239 2,328 2,191 3,105
(2) Others 31,993 35,457 38,652 37,926 38,431 37,154 38,456
(3) All 34,088 37,744 41,017 40,165 40,759 39,345 41,561
ratio (1) / (3) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
Mean age (1) Most deprived (*) 68.40 67.81 68.24 68.23 68.23 68.35 67.86
(2) Others 69.40 69.46 69.55 69.86 69.88 70.06 69.89
(3) All 69.34 69.36 69.48 69.76 69.79 69.96 69.74
gap (1) - (2) -1.00 -1.65 -1.32 -1.63 -1.65 -1.71 -2.03
ratio (1) / (2) 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
Mean number of 
diagnoses (1) Most deprived (*) 2.27 2.29 2.39 2.62 2.98 3.14 3.19
(2) Others 2.19 2.24 2.33 2.59 2.67 2.82 2.90
(3) All 2.19 2.24 2.33 2.59 2.69 2.84 2.92
gap (1) - (2) 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.31 0.32 0.29
ratio (1) / (2) 1.04 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.12 1.11 1.10
Proportion male (1) Most deprived (*) 0.354 0.374 0.360 0.378 0.372 0.375 0.372
(2) Others 0.385 0.387 0.388 0.382 0.377 0.377 0.378
gap (1) - (2) -0.031 -0.013 -0.028 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006
ratio (1) / (2) 0.920 0.966 0.929 0.990 0.988 0.994 0.985
Proportion of 
uncemented hips (1) Most deprived (*) 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.32 0.36
(2) Others 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.37
gap (1) - (2) -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01
ratio (1) / (2) 0.95 0.84 0.96 0.91 0.94 1.00 0.96
2006 2007
Note: (*) = patients resident in the most income deprived 10% of Engish small areas
Variables 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
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Table 3: Mean and standard deviation of length of stay by small area deprivation group 
 
1 - Least deprived mean length of stay (days) 10.42 9.81 9.19 8.75 8.16 7.47 6.65
standard deviation 5.49 5.34 5.22 5.43 5.33 4.93 4.14
% of patients w ithin year 12% 12% 12% 12% 13% 13% 6%
 
2 mean length of stay (days) 10.29 10.00 9.48 8.90 8.29 7.50 6.82
standard deviation 5.40 5.50 5.54 5.70 5.50 4.95 5.05
% of patients w ithin year 8% 8% 8% 9% 8% 8% 6%
 
3 mean length of stay (days) 10.39 10.11 9.37 8.94 8.24 7.55 6.82
standard deviation 5.26 5.75 5.55 5.54 5.27 4.84 4.58
% of patients w ithin year 8% 8% 8% 9% 9% 9% 8%
 
4 mean length of stay (days) 10.56 10.38 9.45 9.06 8.47 7.61 7.05
standard deviation 5.66 5.91 5.37 5.80 5.64 5.13 5.08
% of patients w ithin year 14% 14% 14% 15% 15% 15% 15%
 
5 mean length of stay (days) 10.74 10.36 9.70 9.28 8.53 7.72 7.12
standard deviation 5.89 5.70 5.85 5.73 5.81 5.21 5.08
% of patients w ithin year 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 13%
 
6 mean length of stay (days) 10.99 10.62 9.87 9.44 8.75 7.84 7.02
standard deviation 6.10 6.25 5.90 6.19 5.83 5.28 5.06
% of patients w ithin year 12% 12% 12% 11% 11% 11% 13%
 
7 mean length of stay (days) 11.09 10.77 9.98 9.60 8.91 8.13 7.39
standard deviation 6.21 6.43 6.04 6.16 6.17 5.61 5.62
% of patients w ithin year 11% 11% 11% 11% 10% 11% 12%
 
8 mean length of stay (days) 11.48 11.05 9.94 9.55 8.80 8.01 7.32
standard deviation 6.70 6.38 5.81 6.03 5.68 5.72 5.36
% of patients w ithin year 10% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 11%
 
9 mean length of stay (days) 11.19 11.08 10.31 9.72 9.06 8.45 7.54
standard deviation 6.14 6.29 6.14 5.93 6.02 5.88 5.56
% of patients w ithin year 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9%
 
10 - Most deprived mean length of stay (days) 11.90 11.25 10.49 9.92 9.34 8.42 7.45
standard deviation 6.71 6.16 5.93 6.01 6.33 5.59 5.21
% of patients w ithin year 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7%
Gap in means (10) - (1) 1.48 1.44 1.29 1.18 1.18 0.95 0.80
Gap in standard deviations (10) - (1) 1.22 0.82 0.71 0.58 1.00 0.66 1.07
Ratio of means (10) / (1) 1.14 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.12
Ratio of standard deviations (10) / (1) 1.22 1.15 1.14 1.11 1.19 1.13 1.26
2007Deprivation decile groups 2001
Note: Deprivation decile groups represent tenths of small area deprivation among the general 
population, rather than among the study population of hip replacement patients.
2005 20062002 2003 2004
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(1) 45-54 mean length of stay (days) 8.64 8.39 7.73 7.24 6.78 6.15 5.57
standard deviation 3.92 3.95 3.50 3.51 3.90 3.19 3.19
% of patients w ithin year 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7%
 
(2) 55-64 mean length of stay (days) 9.11 8.73 8.00 7.58 6.94 6.37 5.72
standard deviation 3.91 3.91 3.60 3.97 3.65 3.33 3.11
% of patients w ithin year 23% 23% 22% 21% 22% 22% 22%
 
(3) 65-74 mean length of stay (days) 10.20 9.87 9.15 8.58 7.91 7.07 6.47
standard deviation 4.78 4.97 4.85 4.79 4.49 4.03 4.04
% of patients w ithin year 38% 38% 40% 40% 39% 39% 38%
 
(4) 75-84 mean length of stay (days) 12.81 12.52 11.61 11.05 10.29 9.34 8.62
standard deviation 7.06 7.23 6.95 6.87 6.85 6.38 6.15
% of patients w ithin year 27% 27% 27% 28% 28% 28% 28%
 
(5) 85+ mean length of stay (days) 17.02 16.20 15.42 15.34 14.22 12.99 12.42
standard deviation 9.97 9.33 8.91 9.90 9.79 9.11 9.01
% of patients w ithin year 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5%
 
Gap in means (5) - (1) 8.39 7.81 7.69 8.11 7.44 6.84 6.85
Gap in standard deviations (5) - (1) 6.05 5.38 5.41 6.40 5.89 5.92 5.82
Ratio of means (5) / (1) 1.97 1.93 1.99 2.12 2.10 2.11 2.23
Ratio of standard deviations (5) / (1) 2.54 2.36 2.55 2.82 2.51 2.85 2.83
2005 2006 2007Age group 2001 2002 2003 2004
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Table 5: Mean and standard deviation of length of stay by number of diagnoses group 
 
(1) 1 diagnosis mean length of stay (days) 9.82 9.51 8.81 8.30 7.44 6.69 5.96
standard deviation 4.78 4.83 4.46 4.74 4.40 3.94 3.68
% of patients w ithin year 44% 44% 41% 34% 32% 28% 27%
 
(2) 2 diagnoses mean length of stay (days) 10.48 10.05 9.10 8.58 7.90 7.07 6.31
standard deviation 5.23 5.33 4.82 4.88 4.68 4.25 3.79
% of patients w ithin year 24% 23% 24% 24% 23% 24% 23%
 
(3) 3 diagnoses mean length of stay (days) 11.43 10.93 10.00 9.31 8.56 7.71 6.92
standard deviation 6.27 5.96 5.82 5.58 5.26 4.85 4.38
% of patients w ithin year 15% 15% 16% 18% 18% 19% 20%
 
(4) 4 diagnoses mean length of stay (days) 12.43 11.87 11.05 10.16 9.39 8.26 7.58
standard deviation 6.91 6.77 6.61 6.64 6.18 5.10 5.17
% of patients w ithin year 8% 8% 9% 11% 12% 13% 13%
 
(5) 5 diagnoses mean length of stay (days) 13.61 12.87 12.07 11.20 10.41 9.29 8.74
standard deviation 8.43 7.58 7.79 7.34 7.03 6.20 6.56
% of patients w ithin year 4% 4% 5% 6% 7% 7% 8%
 
(6) 6 diagnoses mean length of stay (days) 14.92 14.98 13.29 11.98 11.44 10.31 9.49
standard deviation 8.67 9.32 8.49 7.81 7.95 7.22 6.99
% of patients w ithin year 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4%
 
(7) 7 diagnoses mean length of stay (days) 16.82 17.31 16.11 14.35 14.31 12.90 12.28
standard deviation 10.10 11.03 10.46 9.65 10.03 9.60 9.17
% of patients w ithin year 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 5% 5%
 
Gap in means (7) - (1) 7.00 7.80 7.30 6.05 6.87 6.21 6.33
Gap in standard deviations (7) - (1) 5.33 6.20 6.00 4.91 5.62 5.66 5.49
Ratio of means (7) / (1) 1.71 1.82 1.83 1.73 1.92 1.93 2.06
Ratio of standard deviations (7) / (1) 2.12 2.28 2.35 2.04 2.28 2.44 2.49
2005 2006 2007Number of diagnoses group 2001 2002 2003 2004
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least deprived decile -1** -.909** -.074**
(.19) (.192) (.0155)
2nd deprivation decile -1.02** -.925** -.0809**
(.181) (.183) (.0146)
3rd deprivation decile -1.02** -.924** -.0781**
(.177) (.178) (.0141)
4th deprivation decile -.886** -.793** -.0653**
(.166) (.167) (.0133)
5th deprivation decile -.757** -.671** -.0534**
(.185) (.187) (.0144)
6th deprivation decile -.651** -.577** -.046**
(.172) (.173) (.014)
7th deprivation decile -.583** -.51** -.0395**
(.168) (.168) (.0132)
8th deprivation decile -.241 -.18 -.0112
(.176) (.175) (.0137)
9th deprivation decile -.516** -.475** -.0328**
(.161) (.159) (.0126)
male -.796** -.796** -.0773**
(.0681) (.0681) (.00571)
age 55-64 .451** .445** .0496**
(.078) (.0779) (.00875)
age 65-74 1.38** 1.38** .149**
(.088) (.0885) (.00927)
age 75-84 3.69** 3.68** .349**
(.123) (.123) (.0121)
age 85 plus 7.75** 7.74** .624**
(.264) (.265) (.018)
2 diagnoses .683** .71** .0674**
(.0788) (.0798) (.00714)
3 diagnoses 1.51** 1.54** .139**
(.112) (.114) (.00975)
4 diagnoses 2.41** 2.46** .214**
(.17) (.171) (.0137)
5 diagnoses 3.6** 3.67** .296**
(.301) (.303) (.02)
6 diagnoses 4.9** 5.01** .396**
(.427) (.431) (.0276)
7 diagnoses 7.03** 7.18** .529**
(.539) (.536) (.0309)
uncemented hip .189 .212 .0231*
(.117) (.122) (.0112)
rheumatoid arthritis, unspecif ied 1.64** 1.63** .143**
(.352) (.352) (.0276)
arthritis, unspecif ied .476 .483 .035
(.399) (.401) (.0316)
primary generalized (osteo)arthrosis -.488 -.467 -.0269
(.4) (.424) (.0343)
polyarthrosis, unspecif ied -.791 -.954 -.0965*
(.452) (.647) (.0452)
primary coxarthrosis, bilateral -.183 -.167 -.0104
(.164) (.172) (.0145)
other primary coxarthrosis -.366* -.356* -.033**
(.144) (.16) (.0127)
other secondary coxarthrosis -.198 -.151 -.0207
(.441) (.511) (.0448)
other primary gonarthrosis -.0811 -.0777 -.00656
(.342) (.35) (.029)
gonarthrosis, unspecif ied .46 .467 .0381
(.367) (.367) (.0306)
arthrosis, unspecif ied .255 .226 .0133
(.575) (.618) (.0554)
pain in joint .285 .26 .0309
(.249) (.254) (.0218)
osteonecrosis, unspecif ied -.564 -.578 -.0481
(.591) (.59) (.0485)
others .89** .864** .0731**
(.223) (.228) (.0183)
Constant 9.07** 8.83** 2.26**
(.221) (.209) (.0145)
Observations 34086 34086 34086
166 Hospital random effects yes
166 Hopspital Fixed effects yes yes
Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses
(2) ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
GLM gamma
(3) The reference group is patients living in most deptived 10% of English 
LSOA, year 2001, age 45-54, female, cemented hip, one diagnosis at the 
admission, primary diagnosis: unspecif ied coxarthrosis.
Dependent variable: length of stay 
(days) OLS RE OLS FE
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Table 7: Adjusted length of stay differentials by year  




2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1) Most deprived decile 11.43 10.90 10.15 9.61 9.01 8.08 7.25
(2) Others 10.81 10.46 9.70 9.24 8.58 7.79 7.13
Gap: (1)-(2) 0.62 0.44 0.45 0.37 0.43 0.29 0.13
Ratio: (1)/(2) 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.02
(1) age 85 and over 16.62 15.62 14.87 14.88 13.82 12.45 11.81
(2) Others 10.56 10.25 9.50 9.01 8.33 7.55 6.89
Gap: (1)-(2) 6.06 5.37 5.37 5.87 5.48 4.89 4.92
Ratio: (1)/(2) 1.57 1.52 1.56 1.65 1.66 1.65 1.71
(1) 7 diagnoses or more 16.96 17.36 15.98 14.15 14.01 12.55 11.91
(2) Others 10.73 10.33 9.56 9.09 8.39 7.57 6.88
Gap: (1)-(2) 6.23 7.02 6.42 5.06 5.62 4.99 5.03
Ratio: (1)/(2) 1.58 1.68 1.67 1.56 1.67 1.66 1.73
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Table 8: Patient level versus hospital level variance in length of stay 
 
Model without patient characteristics
Proportion of variance at hospital level 5.2% 4.2% 5.2% 4.8% 4.3% 4.0% 4.1%
Patient level (within hospitals) variance 33.14 34.04 30.78 33.01 30.99 26.31 24.81
Hospital level (between hospitals) variance 1.83 1.50 1.70 1.66 1.39 1.10 1.05
Model with patient characteristics
Proportion of variance at hospital level 4.8% 4.8% 5.8% 5.1% 4.8% 4.2% 4.5%
Patient level (within hospitals) variance 27.39 28.15 25.55 27.56 25.72 21.66 20.22
Hospital level (between hospitals) variance 1.39 1.42 1.57 1.49 1.29 0.95 0.96
Note 1: Estimates were obtained from the RE OLS model described in Table 6. The model was 
estimated separately each year on a balanced panel of 129 hospitals which were not involved in 
Note 2: LR test rejects the null hypothesis that the between hospitals variance is zero.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Figure 1: Patient length of stay in 2006/7, comparing patients in the most deprived decile 
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Figure 2: Adjusted mean length of stay by small area income deprivation decile group  
by financial year from 2001/2 to 2006/7 
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Figure 3: Adjusted mean length of stay by age group and deprivation decile in 2001/2 
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Figure 4: Adjusted mean length of stay by number of diagnoses and deprivation decile 
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Figure 5: Trust level relationship between the mean deprivation score of patients and mean 
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